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Abstract 
 
It has been suggested that the practice of international development assistance is 
so deeply problematic that the only moral choice is to abandon the work 
altogether. The practice of community development in the Third World has been 
the subject of extensive critique for several decades. Scholars and development 
practitioners speak of the 'tyranny' of development and discuss the ways in which 
development is a means of control and domination rather than an altruistic 
enterprise whereby wealthier nations lend assistance to poorer nations. How are 
these debates relevant to highland development programs in northern Thailand? 
And how are development practitioners responding to the suggestion that they 
are making things worse rather than better? This paper explores the history of 
development in the hills and suggests some ways that development practitioners 
can - and do - take on board recent critiques of development while continuing to 
work for the betterment of highland lives and livelihoods. 
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Introduction 
 
It has been suggested that the practice of international development assistance is 
so deeply problematic that the only moral choice is to abandon the work 
altogether. The practice of community development in the Third World has been 
the subject of extensive critique for several decades. Scholars and development 
practitioners speak of the ‘tyranny’ of development and discuss the ways in which 
development is a means of control and domination rather than an altruistic 
enterprise whereby wealthier nations lend assistance to poorer nations.  How are 
these debates relevant to highland development programs in northern Thailand? 
And how are development practitioners responding to the suggestion that they 
are making things worse rather than better?  
 
This paper explores the history of development in the hills and will suggest some 
approaches through which development practitioners can, and do, take on board 
recent critiques of development while continuing to work for the betterment of 
highland lives and livelihoods.  
 
This paper is based on research undertaken for my PhD in human geography at 
Australian National University. The research was based in Chiang Mai, and 
focused on highland community development and research programs. There has 
been a huge number of researchers, development experts, agronomists, NGO 
staff and so on heading into the hills ever since the late 1960s and early 70s. The 
research grew out of a fascination with the interest in the highlands and a desire 
to know more about what effect all these people were having.  
 
My interest is not only academic – it is also part of my family history. My father 
was one of the first foreign researchers to be employed at the Tribal Research 
Centre, and my family lived in Chiang Mai on and off during the 70s and 80s. I 
grew up around the people whose work I ended up examining in my dissertation, 
and in a household where talk around the dinner table was often focused on the 
political situation in Thailand and the situation in the mountains. When I returned 
to Chiang Mai in 1998 after an absence of 12 years to volunteer for an Akha NGO, 
I had the chance to see for myself that after three decades of development 
intervention – interventions that were supposed to be making life better for 
highland communities – there were still a lot of highlanders in a fairly precarious 
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position: no citizenship rights, no land title even where they had been settled for 
hundreds of years (such as Karen communities in Doi Inthanon), subject to 
constant racism, many struggling to make a living, with many turning to opium, 
heroin and (from the late 90s) yabba or methamphetamine, as a quick and cheap 
way to forget their worries. There seemed to be a serious deficit of happiness in 
the highland communities I got to know and I started to get really curious: after 
so many decades of so many development programs and researchers, so many 
NGOs and missionaries all doing their best in their different ways to ‘improve’ life 
in mountain villages – how could so many people be in a situation of such utter 
despair and hopelessness that they rely on narcotics for some sense of 
happiness? What was happening here? Who were all these people trying to do 
good? And why was it not working? 
 
These questions were the starting point for my research, and when I came back 
to Thailand again in 2000 for my PhD research it was these questions I came 
looking for answers to. Something had gone wrong with the development process 
and I wanted to figure out what role development professionals had played. 
 
I would like to make a note here that I am using “development professionals” as 
a broad term – meant to denote researchers, extension officers, NGO staff, 
foreigners, Thai and highlanders, who are involved in planning, doing and 
researching development in the highlands in a professional capacity. 
 
Development as tyranny? Critical debates on development 
 
I am not the only one who has been questioning development processes of 
course – and my research was also informed by a body of critical debate in 
development studies, geography and anthropology. My work is situated in an 
emerging literature on post-development. The use of the ‘post-’ prefix indicates a 
certain rejection of key aspects of mainstream development thinking. At the same 
time the continued use of  ‘development’ indicates that although we are critical of 
the idea of development, we still think it is an idea that has merit. 
 
Since the 1950s, development has been represented as an altruistic endeavour, 
of wealthy nations helping poor nations, or developed nations lending a hand to 
underdeveloped nations so that they could ‘catch up’ to the standards of living 
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enjoyed in the west. A classic example of this kind of rhetoric is a famous quote 
by President Truman in his inaugural speech in 1949: 
 
We must embark [President Truman said] on a bold new program for making the 
benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.  
 
The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our plans.  
What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of 
democratic fair dealing (Esteva 1992: 6, parenthesis in the original). 
 
The post-development critics such as Esteva (1992), Escobar (1995), Ferguson 
(1994), and Yapa (2002) argue that in fact development has been simply a new 
kind of imperialism, and exploitation for foreign profit has played a huge part – 
although the profit has not always been financial. These critics argue that 
international aid acts as an instrument of power and control; that understanding 
the world as divided into ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ grants economic, 
cultural, moral, political and intellectual superiority to the First World, and 
constructs the Third World only in terms of the ways in which it is deficient and 
lacking. The act of imagining the world in this way creates the rationale for the 
development industry to exist; the rationale that charges largely First World 
agencies and professionals with the responsibility of introducing structural 
adjustment, economic progress, social change. 
 
For some post-development critics, development is simply a conduit for such First 
World agencies to assert their dominance over the Third World, all in the name of 
progress. For some critics, the whole process is so morally corrupt that the idea 
of development itself needs to be got rid of. For others in the post-development 
camp, however, (such as Gibson-Graham, 2005; Parfitt, 2002; and in Escobar’s 
more recent work, 2004) the idea of offering a lending hand to people struggling 
with poverty is a worthy aim, and despite the problems with development – the 
idea of trying to help, and to achieve a more egalitarian global community, is still 
something worth striving for. 
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The hill tribe problem and development in the highlands 
 
How are these debates relevant to highland development programs in northern 
Thailand? And how are development practitioners responding to the suggestion 
that they might be acting as instruments of a new kind of imperialism? I will 
move now to exploring the history of highland development with these questions 
in mind. 
 
For at least four decades highland communities in the mountainous northern 
borderlands of Thailand have been the subject of extensive research and 
development activities.  Between the late 1960s and 2000, highland villages were 
the focus of activities for approximately 20 internationally funded multilateral 
development projects with a total budget between them of approximately 185 
million US dollars (Renard 2001: 70-71); at least 158 registered non-government 
organisations (NGOs) if not more (Kampe, unpublished data 1995); and an 
indeterminate number of researchers – including at least 101 foreign researchers 
who registered with the Tribal Research Institute between 1968-1992 (Tribal 
Research Institute 1992).  
 
The highland population that was the focus of all this attention was estimated to 
be approximately 770,0001 in 1997 (Hill Tribe Welfare Division of the Department 
of Public Welfare, cited by Satawat and Nipatvej 2001) out of a total population in 
Thailand of approximately 60 million (National Statistics Office 2000 cited by 
Satawat and Nipatvej 2001: 1).  ‘Hill tribes’ or ‘highlanders’ are catch-all phrases 
used to describe these 770,000, though in fact the number encompasses very 
diverse communities. The Ministry for the Interior officially recognizes ten groups 
as ‘hill tribes’: Karen, Hmong, Yao, Akha, Lahu, Lisu, Lua, Htin, Khamu, and 
Mlabri. Over time these groups have been distinguished by anthropologists on the 
basis of culture, the altitude at which they tend to establish villages, their farming 
systems, and their language group.  
 
In contemporary Thailand, significant numbers of highlanders live and work in 
lowland towns and cities. Historically, the ‘hill tribes’ made their homes in the 
mountainous landscape that now forms the borderlands stretching from the Thai-
                                          
1 This figure is for the groups classified by the Ministry for the Interior as ‘hill tribes’: Karen, Hmong, 
Yao, Akha, Lahu, Lisu, Lua, Htin, Khamu, and Mlabri. 
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Burma border, across northern Laos and southern China, to the northern 
highlands of Vietnam.2 Many family or village groups migrated across these 
borders into what is now Thai territory after contemporary state boundaries were 
created, perhaps moving to escape conflict in neighbouring countries or for 
economic reasons, or simply following connections with kin who had already 
migrated into these areas. But many groups were also in Thai territory for much 
longer – and since before the current borders were drawn between Thailand, 
Burma and Laos, the ‘hill tribes’ have built their villages in the mountains and 
upland valleys of this region and cleared pockets of forest to grow rice, 
vegetables and (sometimes) opium.  
 
With the advent of the development era these diverse highland communities 
became redefined as a problematic population. Highland communities started to 
be represented as a population inadequately understood, and thus in need of 
research attention, and as a population in need of help, through the interventions 
of development agencies.  
 
The emergence of the ‘hill tribe problem’ 
 
Since the mid-1960s the highland population has been defined as problematic for 
a range of reasons, including opium, drug trafficking, national security during the 
Cold War, illegal immigration, destruction of forests, erosion, and water pollution 
among others. The idea of a problematic hill tribe population brought significant 
resources into Chiang Mai, through a range of development programs and 
research projects that employed both foreign and Thai academics and 
development professionals. Many of these programs commenced work based on 
the assumption that the problems of drug trafficking, forest destruction and so 
on, were genuine and needed to be addressed. But the story of the ‘hill tribe 
problem’ is not so simple, and it is  important to understand how the ‘problem’ 
emerged in order to understand what has been happening in the hills over these 
past decades. 
 
To properly understand how the ‘hill tribe problem’ emerged as it did, we must 
begin well before the era of development commenced, in the pre-colonial 
                                          
2 It is important to recognise that a significant proportion of those living in highland areas, if not the 
majority, are in fact ‘lowland’ Thais (see Hinton 1969; McKinnon and Wanat 1983). 
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kingdoms that were incorporated in the contemporary Thai state. Histories of 
‘Thailand’ often seem to take for granted that Thailand as such has always 
existed, that the current boundaries and government have more or less been 
inherited from a long established political entity. Recent work of historians such 
as Thongchai (1996; 2000a, 2000b) and Renard (2000) makes clear that 
Thailand, as both a nation and a territory,  emerged only over the last 150 years, 
and it took its shape largely in response to the influence of colonial powers on the 
geo-politics of the region.3 A very different sense of territoriality and nationality 
existed during the pre-colonial era.4  
 
In the pre-colonial era, borders were much less clearly delineated, and the state 
structures followed a system very different from a contemporary vision of the 
nation in which a group of people and a particular territory is something defined 
by birth.  Prior to the colonial period, the state system that predominated in 
South-East Asia was focused around networks of city-states which were based in 
cities such as Chiang Mai. From centres like Ayutthaya and Chiang Mai, rule was 
established not through the conquest of land, but through the formation of 
allegiances.  In this system rule was not uniformly established across contiguous 
space (Bowie 2000; Osborne 2002; Renard 2000; Thongchai 1994). Instead, 
there were pockets of state spaces in which individual tenants, towns and 
agricultural communities maintained allegiances with the lords of the land, who 
were, in turn, aligned with the rulers of the city-states. 
 
In between these governed and protected spaces lay forests and mountains which 
were subject to more local modes of rule within individual villages and 
communities.  These were ostensibly non-state spaces (Scott 2000) that were a 
refuge for bandits and refugees and the domain of autonomous self-governing 
societies of highlanders. Within this system there were state subjects who were 
tied into a system of allegiance with the ruling powers. Alongside, there were 
non-state subjects who had, at best, only fleeting loyalties to valley kingdoms. 
People were able to move between state spaces and non-state spaces, from 
highland to lowland, from forest to city, and vice versa. 
 
                                          
3 This is a widely accepted characteristic of Thai modernity, see for example Osborne (2002), Tarling 
(1998), Wyatt (1984). 
4 Thongchai (1994) explores the shifting territoriality of the Thai state, and more recently (2000a, 
2000b) has considered shifting concepts of ethnicity in Thai statehood. 
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This is a very different system to what was to come with the colonial era. 
Following British and French incursions into mainland Southeast Asia, a new 
concept of the nation-state was introduced, in which states were expected to 
establish rule over contiguous spaces that were clearly defined by a cartographic 
boundary. A nation-state is a space of continuous rule by the state, and there is 
no room for non-state spaces – one state’s border meets the next, and 
movement across the boundaries is carefully controlled. At the same time, those 
who are identified as subjects within the state are defined according to a shared 
nationality – a shared heritage, a shared cultural history, a shared ethnicity. 
 
When the British and French arrived, it was quite suddenly no longer adequate to 
have a fuzzy non-state buffer between one kingdom and its neighbours – the land 
had to be mapped and clear lines drawn that demarcated exactly what was and 
was not Thai territory. Through a long process of negotiation between the 
Siamese, British and French authorities, the modern borders of Thailand were 
finally set down in the early 1900s. At the same time it was necessary to define 
who was and was not a true Thai. The Siamese set about a campaign to construct 
a shared Thai identity – to create an integrated state made up of “many peoples, 
Tai speaking and others, who had little previous connection with the Kingdom of 
Siam” (Wyatt 1984). Of course the process was not smooth: laying claim to the 
territory was not the same thing as being able to govern every inch inside the 
national boundary; and not everyone was included in this new state – 
highlanders, for example, were left out of a newly formed Thai national identity.  
 
And so it went until the rise of the Cold War – Thailand’s borders were clear on 
paper, but actual effective government of the border areas did not extend to the 
full territory of Thailand, and not every person living within those borders was 
officially a subject of the Thai state. In the 1950s, however,  it became important 
that the Thai government have complete control over its borders. The political 
climate in the region shifted dramatically following the defeat of the French at 
Dien Ben Phu in 1954. With communist governments being established in China, 
Laos, North Korea, and the beginnings of the war against communist forces in 
Vietnam, it was feared that Thailand would be the next to ‘fall.’ At this time the 
United States focused on Thailand as an independent state to be defended 
against communism, and as a regional power to be wooed to the cause of 
containing communism in the region (Wyatt 1984). Compared to its neighbours 
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Thailand was seen as politically stable, especially under the rule of the Phibun 
government from 1948 to 1957. Thailand thus became the focus of international 
efforts to ‘stop the spread’ of communism.  
 
Development assistance was a central tool through which the international 
community, and particularly the United States, sought to address such political 
concerns. In part development emerged as a strategy of the democratic ‘free’ 
Western world to combat not only poverty, but the spread of communism. 
Development assistance was a way to secure the loyalties of ‘underdeveloped’ 
countries that were supposedly in danger of becoming communist. Thailand – 
identified early on as a strategic ally in the war against communism in Asia – thus 
became the focus of considerable development assistance from the United States. 
 
Concerns about national security 
 
National and international concerns with the region’s vulnerability to communist 
takeover translated into concerns about the prospect of communist forces forging 
alliances with highlanders.  Highlanders were recognised for their intimate 
knowledge of the borderlands and exceptional communication channels between 
scattered mountain settlements across state borders. Saihoo, lecturer in Social 
Anthropology at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, noted that in the absence 
of a strong sense of ‘national loyalty,’ it was feared that 
 
given adequate support and encouragement from outside, the hill tribes in a 
particular country may easily engage themselves in subversive activities to further 
their own ends or to put up resistance to the national authority which seeks to 
impose some control contrary to their interests (Saihoo 1963: 16-17).5  
 
The concerns that the highlands could be a conduit for communist aggression 
against the Thai government certainly seemed justified in Nan province with 
Hmong rebellion in 1967 (Hanks and Hanks 2001), which the Thai government 
identified as a communist uprising. Hmong who had been involved told Hanks and 
Hanks (2001) that the insurrection was a response to repeated attempts of Thai 
                                          
5 In fact, the United States was quite successfully exploiting a very similar strategy against the North 
Vietnamese by recruiting and arming Hmong to fight against North Vietnamese forces. The assistance 
of highlanders was secured due to ongoing economic support from the CIA which took the form of the 
purchase and transportation of heroin (McCoy 1972, 1991).  
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officials to exact exorbitant fines for cutting trees without permission. Robert 
Cooper reports that “police patrols were only ambushed after they had destroyed 
Hmong villages which refused to pay an increase in the unofficial tax that is levied 
on opium cultivation in some areas” (Cooper 1979: 325-326). 
 
Regardless of the underlying causes the Thai government responded as if it was a 
communist inspired uprising. Hmong and Yao villages in the area were cleared 
out. The Thai Cabinet declared the area a free fire zone, and it remained so into 
the 1970s. All villages in the free fire zone were evacuated and anyone remaining 
in the hills was considered a communist. At some point during this time the 
insurrection became a reality and Thai army units in the hills were targeted by 
rebels – even the governer of Chiang Rai and his police chief were killed in an 
ambush on a mountain road (Hanks and Hanks 2001). The Hanks’ interviews with 
Hmong who lived in the region at the time make it clear that Pathet Lao – the 
eventually triumphant communist faction in the Laos Civil War – was recruiting 
among Hmong across the Thai border, and supporting the insurrection with arms 
and ammunition (Hanks and Hanks 2001: 196) 
 
Concerns about opium 
 
As the issue of national security came to prominence as a ‘problem’ in the 
highlands, the issue of opium production also began to be discussed as part of a 
discourse of the ‘hill tribe problem.’  Opium has been grown in the region for 
centuries for its medicinal qualities. Following the 1839-1842 and 1858 Opium 
Wars between Britain and China, and China’s subsequent legalisation of the trade, 
opium became a major cash crop in China. Cultivation of opium was legalised in 
Thailand in 1855 and was strictly regulated under the Royal Opium Department. 
This department acted regulated opium supply which was then sold at exorbitant 
prices at licensed opium dens. The drug was only banned after many years of 
internal negotiation in the ranks of the leading military and police personnel. In 
1957 Field Marshall Sarit launched a campaign to make opium illegal, but was 
persuaded that the opium revenue was still vital to secure the ongoing loyalty of 
his subordinates, and so the campaign rested (Chupinit, pers. com. 2001). Under 
strong international pressure (particularly from the United States) opium was 
finally made illegal in 1958 (Proclamation of the Revolutionary Party, No.37, 9 
Dec 1958, cited by Wanat 1989: 13).  By this time however, the opium crop – 
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which was ideally suited to the difficult terrain and touchy soils of the highlands – 
was well established as an important cash crop to supplement the livelihoods of 
many communities in the highlands (Geddes 1976). 
 
The problem of environmental destruction 
 
A final component to what would become a three pronged ‘hill tribe problem’ 
hinged on the concern that rotational farming methods were causing 
environmental damage and deforestation.6 Rotational, or swidden farming 
systems are commonly used in upland areas where irrigation systems cannot be 
built due to unreliable water supply or particularly difficult terrain. Fields are 
cleared in the forest and planted in rice and vegetables. When yields start to 
decrease the fields are either left fallow or are abandoned altogether, leaving the 
forest to entirely reclaim the fields.7 Recent research shows that this system is 
one of the most ecologically sound for the highland environment: it maintains 
bio-diversity, protects forest cover, and sustains soil fertility without the use of 
fertilisers. However, it was assumed very early one that swidden agriculture was 
innately harmful, as well wasteful. This was an idea most likely introduced to 
Thailand from British colonial authorities in Burma (Renard, pers. com. 2001).   
 
The Thai Royal Forestry Department was established in 1876 under the leadership 
of Slade, an Englishman trained in German forestry. The German forestry model 
is based on carefully managed single species plantation forests, clearly separated 
from agricultural endeavours whose proper place was in the lowland valleys. The 
existence of agricultural lands scattered through the forests was an affront to the 
German forestry system of clearly delineated and carefully managed forest lands, 
as distinct from settled agricultural land. The regular clearing of forest by swidden 
farmers was also widely considered to be an extremely wasteful use of resources 
(see for example Pendleton (1945) and Blofield (1955) discussed in Saihoo, 
1963).   
  
                                          
6 Sturgeon (1997) discusses the ways in which state exclusions of ‘hill tribes’ are articulated through 
policies of environmental management, and have subsequently shaped the environmental 
management practices of highlanders. 
7 On swidden farming in the north see Grandstaff (1980) Keen (1972) Kunstadter et al. (1978) 
McKinnon (1989). 
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It was not long before this ‘wasteful’ method of agriculture was to be considered 
a serious problem. Despite the lack of “accurate data” the Department of Public 
Welfare estimated in 1964 that hill tribe activity had destroyed 67% of forest in 
Chiang Mai and Lamphun provinces. By 1960, when the first highland Land 
Settlement Projects were established, so-called “slash-and-burn” agriculture had 
been made illegal (Manndorff 1967: 533).  
 
Although there was not yet any “complete data or results of specific studies” 
(Saihoo 1963: 15), by 1963 the three interrelated issues of swidden, national 
security, and opium were well entrenched as a ‘hill tribe problem’ that needed to 
be urgently addressed. Saihoo characterised these three issues (quoted verbatim) 
as follows: 
 
It is by now generally agreed among persons interested in Thailand hill tribes that 
they invite careful consideration in three important respects: 
1. Their shifting cultivation which involves the destruction of extensive areas 
of the forests on the mountains and moving the villages in search of new 
fields with possible consequences of soil erosion and damage to 
watersheds which would affect the supply of water for the lowland Thai 
cultivators. 
2. Their little recognition of international boundaries and national authority 
and control with possible consequences of border insecurity, especially in 
the present world political situations, for the country in which they reside. 
3. The production of raw opium of some tribes which supplies the country and 
the world with an illegal and harmful product in various forms (Saihoo 
1963: 15). 
 
In the absence of hard data, trust was placed in the “reliable observations of 
those who are in well-qualified positions” (Saihoo 1963: 15). On this tenuous 
basis the three-point ‘hill tribe problem’ would form the cornerstone of 
development and research policy from the 1960s to 2000.8  
 
When development began to get underway in the highlands it was driven by 
these three interrelated concerns. For example, the objectives of the Hill Tribe 
Development and Welfare Program as stated in 1964 were: 
                                          
8 The dominance of the three pronged ‘hill tribe’ problem is widely recognised. For specific discussion 
see Kammerer (1989), Kampe (1992). 
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1. To promote and develop the socio-economic standard of the hill tribes by 
ways of promoting their occupation, education and health as well as 
helping develop their own communities. 
2. To prevent forest and watershed destruction by way of introducing 
stabilized farming. 
3. To abolish opium production by way of introducing other occupations to 
replace opium raising. 
4. To guarantee the public safety in border provinces by way of promoting 
mutual understanding and loyalty (Department of Public Welfare 1964). 
 
The three core ‘problems’ for which aid was required, happened, conveniently, to 
coincide with international geo-political concerns of the day. The Thai Ministry for 
the Interior began to take interest in the highlands around the height of the Cold 
War and in the midst of the United State’s engagement in Vietnam. It was also a 
time when the trade in narcotics and the preservation of old growth forests were 
internationally emerging concerns.  
 
The issue of opium eradication was to become a core focus of many of the 
interventions in the highlands. It was a focus which would allow projects to 
simultaneously address issues of national security, the threat of communism and 
deforestation.   
 
International involvement in the drug eradication process in Thailand came out of 
an international conference on drugs held at UN offices in Geneva at the end of 
the 1950s. Thailand had only recently banned the production of opium in 1958. At 
the conference the United States was negotiating for sole involvement in the 
opium eradication process. Under an informal (and still unacknowledged) 
agreement with the United States, Thai representatives at the conference were 
under-reporting opium production figures. In the course of proceedings however 
the Thai contingent rethought whether it might be in Thailand’s best interests to 
allow the United States to be the sole international assistance with crop 
eradication. Overnight the official figures for opium production in Thailand 
presented at the conference grew by several hundred tonnes, and the Thai 
delegation was able to recruit international support for crop eradication programs 
(Geddes, pers. comm. with John Mckinnon 1977).  
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The process of negotiating development assistance was always more than simply 
identifying an appropriate way to deal with real problems. Sole charge of the 
opium eradication process could also mean unique access on the ground for the 
United States at a time when the border regions were still beyond  direct 
government of the Thai state. Given Thailand’s reliance on United States’ aid 
money it is not surprising that the government was initially supportive of this. 
The final decision to negotiate for development assistance with a broad range of 
international powers (including Germany, the Netherlands, Australia and the 
United Nations), was an astute move which would ensure that no single 
international power gained too much of a foothold in the borderlands. 
 
Unlike the accusation by some post-development authors that development is 
about the First World asserting its power over the Third World, this case 
demonstrates the degree to which Thai state authorities were able to negotiate 
arrangements that suited their own interests. While allowing United States 
military and security activities to continue, the Thai administration also ensured 
they would not have free rein in the mountains.  
 
Although it was underpinned by regional geopolitical concerns of the Cold War, 
the ‘hill tribe problem’ articulated broader international concerns. The ‘problem’ 
itself called for a remedy which could be provided by international development 
donors. 
 
The very process of defining a ‘hill tribe problem’ identified both a problem which 
development projects could be established to address, and defined a new ‘hill 
tribe’ subject which could become the focus of a range of interventions. The ‘hill 
tribes’ became defined by the ‘problems’ they represented. Official definitions of 
‘hill tribes’ are exemplified by the following extract from a Department of Public 
Welfare (DPW) brief on the Hill Tribe Development and Welfare Programme, 
1964. It is an example that has not dated at all: 
 
It is estimated that there are between 200,000 – 300,000 hill peoples living 
interspersedly [sic] in the densely forested hill ranges of Northern Thailand. These 
people belong to various tribes having their own distinguished languages, cultures, 
traditions, beliefs etc. Most of them raise and sell opium, practice shifting 
cultivation and always keep on moving to hunt for new pieces of land for 
cultivation which have greatly resulted in the forest and watershed destruction. 
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These hill tribes are generally illiterate, have ill health and are economically 
deprived and could become the victims of [communist] infiltration so easily. These 
lead to the problems of social economic development, administration and political 
security of the nation which therefore demand the most urgent solution 
(Department of Public Welfare 1964: 1). 
 
In this picture the ‘hill tribes’ are identified by their primitiveness, their illiteracy, 
ill health and economic deprivation, and by their destructive agricultural 
practices, for which they must “always keep on moving.”   This representation of 
dirty and problematic ‘hill tribes’ attributed a single identity to diverse and 
widespread communities on the basis of a shared ‘problem’ they presented to the 
Thai state.  
 
The act of problematisation was an important step in the process of establishing 
state rule in the highlands. By identifying a problem that needed to be fixed, the 
Thai state created a rationale for getting more involved in the highlands, and a 
reason to being exercising greater control over the border regions. Rendering the 
hill tribes ‘problematic’ made it possible to subject them to the tools of 
government: registration, policing, survey and ultimately development. These 
measures would succeed in transforming the highlands from ungoverned to 
governed spaces, bringing them into Thai-land. 
 
Domestic development measures 
 
The Border Patrol Police (BPP) was the first agency charged with working in the 
mountains in 1955. Their work involved patrolling remote areas; forging contacts; 
establishing schools; and sometimes, intimidating the population. The 
establishment of the BPP was the first step towards bringing the northern 
borderlands under state control, and thus actualising the vision of a nation-state 
as a contiguous territory, uniformly part of Thai-land, and uniformly under the 
governing gaze of the state. It involved an odd blend of policing, establishing 
links between state institutions and highland villages, and introducing Thai 
schools and health services.  
 
As the beginnings of a process of bringing highlanders into the embrace of the 
state, BPP interventions began to establish highlanders as inside the state. As 
insiders, highlanders could be distinguished from and used as a defence against a 
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new threatening outside – the communist insurgent. Bringing villagers under the 
‘care’ and ‘protection’ of the Thai kingdom was a step towards ensuring their 
loyalty to the kingdom, and lessening the likelihood that they might be recruited 
by communist insurgents.  
 
The responsibilities first taken on by the BPP were soon taken up by the Hill Tribe 
Development and Welfare Program introduced resettlement projects that sought 
to bring highlanders within the circle of government surveillance and control: 
 
The primary purpose was to settle hill tribes in locations suited for them, by means 
of establishing ‘settlement areas’ (Nikhom) on the ridges and high plateaus which 
are the most favoured sites of the hill peoples, and by encouraging the tribes to 
migrate to the settlement areas (Manndorff 1967: 531-532).  
 
In this way it was hoped the projects could address the most urgent concerns of 
government authorities with ‘the hill tribe problem’: dangerous and destructive 
agricultural practices of slash and burn, opium cultivation, and the national 
security risk that was posed by an un-governed and mobile population.  
 
The Nikhom experienced some “setbacks” during the initial period of operation, in 
part because “the Thai were not at all experienced in hill agriculture. In the 900 
years of their history in Thailand they had never taken great interest in the 
mountains. It took some time to realise that the concepts and experience derived 
from lowland settlements could not easily be transplanted into the hills” 
(Manndorf 1967: 532). The Land Settlement Projects were reshaped as highland 
development blocks to cultivate experimental cash crops, establish training 
centres and provide health, education, and welfare services for hill people living 
nearby.   
 
In response to the initial failures of the Nikhom, the Public Welfare Department 
established Mobile Development Teams in the late 1960s. The idea behind the 
mobile teams was that, 
 
since it would be unrealistic to expect that those tribesmen scattered over the hills 
would migrate into the sphere of the settlements (or even visit and study their 
demonstration plots), the hill tribes should be approached in their own villages... in 
CIGAD Working Paper No. 9/2005 
 
Centre for Indigenous Governance and Development 
- 16 - 
 
their own world, in their own physical and social environment (Manndorf 1967: 
537). 
 
The teams were made up of Public Welfare Department recruits, all lowland Thais 
who had been employed straight out of tertiary education. The three member 
teams consisted of one leader, who had usually completed an undergraduate 
degree in social science; an agricultural extension worker who had studied at 
agriculture college; and a sanitary worker with at least three years of high school 
and hospital training (Chupinit, pers. comm. 2001).  
 
To these young team members the mountains was like another world. Ajhan 
Chupinit Kesmanee, a former team leader and now lecturer Srinakharinwirot 
University, recalls how –  although they remained within Thailand’s borders – 
going into the mountains in those times was like “going to another country” 
(Chupinit, pers. comm. 2001). Most villages could only be reached on foot and 
teams would often spend weeks at a time walking from village to village. The 
food was different, the language was different – in stark contrast to the 
contemporary situation in which the majority of villages have road access, Thai 
television and the village shop usually sells a range of instant noodles, sweets, 
Coca-Cola and the ubiquitous Red Bull. In this setting, the teams’ practical duties 
were to promote agricultural systems as alternatives to shifting cultivation and 
alternatives to opium crops; to provide a primary health care service; and to 
provide identification documents such as household registration, birth, death and 
marriage certificates, and travel permits. The presence of the Mobile Teams in 
this remote and unfamiliar place began a process through which the highlands 
would become less like “another country” and more like part of Thailand.  
 
Calling in the ‘foreign experts’ 
 
The BPP and the Mobile Development Teams were only the first step in what 
would become a much more extensive process involving internationally funded 
multi-lateral development programs and teams of international researchers. A 
discourse of a ‘hill tribe problem’ created a space of development in the highlands 
in which highlanders were reconfigured as problematic ‘hill tribe’ subjects and to 
which development ‘experts’ could be called in for remedial action. Over the next 
two decades the United Nations, and the governments of the United States, 
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Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Germany among others, would 
establish multi-lateral development programs in the highlands.  
 
The Tribal Research Centre (TRC) was also established in 1964. The TRC received 
foreign support in the form of anthropological advisors from Australia and New 
Zealand and funding for the library and photographic and recording equipment 
from Britain. Non-Thai anthropologists would provide initial leadership for the 
Centre until Thai researchers, apprenticed to the trained anthropologists, received 
enough training to take over the research work at the Centre.  
 
The social scientists at the Tribal Research Centre were to provide research 
results which would help to shape government policy and provide the knowledge 
which would help to resolve the problems of the highlands.  
 
Foreign expertise was also called in to help address the ‘hill tribe problem’ 
through community development projects on the ground. The first international 
development project got underway in 1972. This project, the Joint Thai-United 
Nations Programme for Drug Abuse Control, was the first of many multi-lateral 
opium crop replacement programs.  
 
While opium crop replacement was often the central focus of these projects, the 
process of finding alternative cash crops was expected to simultaneously address 
issues of national security and deforestation through the increased contact 
between highland communities and state officials, and the introduction of 
permanent cropping systems which would entail permanent settlement.  
 
There was broad consensus across the DPW, UNDCP, and international partners in 
multi-lateral highland development programs that these ‘hill tribe problems’ could 
be addressed by improving farming methods and replacing opium with alternative 
cash crops.  ‘Improvement’ meant moving to permanent fields of paddy rice, fruit 
orchards or cabbages, simultaneously preventing the destruction of more forests 
due to practices of clearing the fields in rotational farming methods, reducing 
erosion by moving to more intensive cropping on less steep land, and eliminating 
opium production in the move to ‘harmless’ crops such as coffee, kidney beans 
and cabbages.  These cash crops did not fit in with the rotations of the swidden 
agricultural system, and thus, it was expected that the process of taking up such 
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permanent crops would mean that highland settlements would also become 
permanent, and people would cease to regularly migrate to new village sites and 
new fields in the mountains (Geddes 1967; Manndorff 1965, 1967; Wanat 1989). 
As well as ensuring that no more virgin forest was cleared for fields, permanent 
settlements would be much easier for state institutions to access, and thus to 
regulate and administer.   
 
But, despite the fact that many of the multi-lateral projects had as part of their 
brief to facilitate the “integration of highland populations into the mainstream of 
the Thai nation” (Dirksen 1993: 4),  none of them succeeded in obtaining the 
citizenship papers or land title that would signal formal recognition of the 
legitimacy of highlanders as part of Thailand.  The only project that came to close 
was the Mae Chaem Integrated Watershed Development Project run by USAID. 
The USAID project introduced coffee as an opium replacement crop.  In order to 
give villagers the confidence to invest in the new crop USAID had negotiated with 
the Thai authorities to have land certificates issued. When Royal Forestry 
Department officials objected the project went so far as to withhold funding for a 
year until the Thai Cabinet passed special legislation to exempt the area from 
Royal Forestry Department regulations. Over 4000 permits were issued, only to 
be revoked after the project ended and the village fields had long been converted 
to coffee production (Kampe, pers. com. 2001) 
 
This was as close as any project got to obtaining for highlanders the rights 
accorded to the Thais of Thai-land.  While development projects were helping to 
make the highlands governable, they did not (and could not) make highlanders 
national subjects.  
 
After years of development programs highland communities remain in a tenuous 
situation within the Thai state. The discourse of  the three-fold ‘hill tribe problem’ 
has changed, but the same scape-goating still occurs. This is evidenced for 
example, in hill tribes being blamed for recent flooding in Chiang Mai, for 
polluting waterways, for AIDs; and in the fact that highlanders are still seen as 
illegal immigrants. The landscape for professional involvement has altered 
considerably through the emergence of many local NGOs focused on advocacy 
work. Many of these are succeeding in lobbying at the national political level for 
highland rights, especially highlanders’ rights to citizenship and land title. 
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A rough view of what development programs have achieved over the decades 
reveals mixed results. The opium crop has been largely eradicated – although 
Renard (2001) claims that this was more due to action taken to burn opium fields 
than to the interventions of development programs. All highland villages are now 
permanent settlements, and have been incorporated in a national state 
administration and the national Thai education system (at the primary school 
level). At the same time, however, the interventions of development programs 
haven’t necessarily meant that highlanders are able to enjoy more stable 
livelihoods, and despite the emphasis that was placed on the aim to foster 
national loyalty, key components of this – such as issuing citizenship papers or 
land title – have been missing (see McKinnon, 2005). Furthermore, some 
observers argue that the process of development has led to a decline of 
traditional cultural practices and point to escalating rates of drug addiction in 
highland communities as a clear sign that life is not better than it used to be, but 
worse (see Chupinit and Gebert, 1993).  
 
Development professionals and the desire to do good 
 
So far this brief review of highland development seems to support the contention 
that I began with: that development is an instrument of power and control; that 
it is about obtaining power over populations and territory, rather than being a 
project of social justice. This is not, however, an entirely fair picture – not once 
we start to look at what development professionals in this community, in Chiang 
Mai, have been striving towards for all these years.  
 
The professionals I worked most closely with during my research maintain a 
strong ethic of working for the people, and see their role as facilitating a process 
through which highlanders can make a better life for themselves. Even the most 
cynical, and those that present the least optimistic view of what development has 
managed to achieve, continue to see their role in that way and continue to strive 
towards some sense of social justice (for further discussion refer to McKinnon, 
2006 in press). 
 
These professionals have worked hard over the years, often working against the 
prevailing climate – politically and in the organisation they have been part of. 
Through persistence and hope, development professionals have made significant 
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contributions in northern Thailand. Professionals have provided vocal and 
powerful critique of existing hill tribe policy and have undertaken research that 
has undermined the key tenants of the ‘hill tribe problem’. Non-highlander 
professionals have played an important role as advocates for emerging highland 
organisations, and with Thailand’s more liberal democratic environment since the 
early 1990s, highland leaders have been able to foster increasing activism by 
highlanders as well as a new leadership within the burgeoning NGO movement. 
Development professionals have also played a central role in pushing for a 
participatory approach in all highland development – an approach through which 
the concerns and interests of highland communities are the basis for any 
development work that is done. 
 
This list of achievements is perhaps not what most professionals had hoped to 
achieve through their work. But it is testament to the positive impacts 
professionals can have – a far cry from the post-development critic’s assertion 
that it would be best to just not do development work for fear of the harm that it 
can bring. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Development processes in the highlands, like development processes everywhere, 
are always political: the problems to be solved are defined by actors working on a 
particular political scene;  any development effort has to contend with the way 
the problem was imagined, as well as the contemporary political context at local, 
national and international levels. If development professionals are going to 
continue to try and head out into the work and do something to help people, then 
what they can do (and what they are doing) is to work with a strong awareness of 
what they are really hoping to achieve: that is, a vision of a fairer, more 
egalitarian world, where disenfranchised people like the highlanders get a good 
shot at a happy, secure life. Professionals also have to try and achieve this vision 
with a full awareness that development is a game of politics, embedded in specific 
political situations and a bureaucratic setting. Development professionals must 
themselves be political creatures, working to formulate strategies based in an 
alert engagement with the politics of development. 
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